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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the role of trading partner’ growth and a domestic import tariff in the 
possibility of growing through trade. To this purpose, a Ricardian model is developed in 
which a backward economy seeks to increase its long-run growth rate simply by trading 
with a faster growing partner. It is found that domestic growth may be either negatively 
affected or unaffected by a domestic import tariff, while it is always positively impacted 
by foreign growth. Furthermore, convergence in growth rate can emerge both with an 
import tariff and under free trade. Ours results are consistent with the empirical 
evidence. 
Keywords: growing through trade, technological differences, trading partner’ growth, 
import tariff 




Despite the profusion of studies on the connection between trade and economic growth, 
no conclusive results have been obtained on this issue (e.g. Rodríguez and Rodrik, 
2001; Singh, 2010). However, some of the empirical literature indicates that domestic 
features are not the only ones playing a role, but also foreign conditions. Indeed, the 
econometric findings in Arora and Vamvakidis (2005b) reveal that the trading partners’ 
growth has a greater impact on domestic growth than trade openness. They separated 
countries between closed and open ones, according to Sachs and Warner (1995) 
definition, and in both cases obtained that a country’s growth is positively affected by 
their partners’ growth rate.1 While empirical studies have found a positive linkage 
between domestic and foreign growth (e.g. Easterly, 2001; Calderón et al., 2004; Arora 
and Vamvakidis, 2005a, 2006 and 2011), the findings regarding the relationship 
between trade policy and growth are mixed (e.g. Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2001; Clements 
and Williamson, 2004; DeJong and Ripoll 2006; Madsen, 2009). 
Based on this empirical evidence, this paper aims to contribute to the literature on 
trade as an engine for long-run growth, by studying how the possibility of growing 
through trade is affected by the trading partner’s growth rate and a domestic import 
tariff. To do so, we build on Ventura’s model (1997) and consider two technologically 
different countries: a backward economy (country B) that seeks to increase its long-run 
growth rate simply by trading with a faster growing partner (country P). Our model 
belongs to the rather scarce literature on trade and growth that involves neither 
international technology transfers nor international spillovers,2 where the impacts of 
                                                 
1 They followed a panel data approach covering the period 1960-1999 and including 100 countries. 
2 We do not address the reasons why country B does not adopt advanced technologies from abroad. 
According to Parente and Prescott (2000), the reason lies in the barriers to technology adoption raised to 
protect vested interests of some economic groups. 
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trade on growth operate solely via the comparative advantage. In addition, in the long-
run countries exchange increasing amounts of goods at constant terms of trade (e.g. 
Manresa and Pigem-Vigo, 1999; Acemoğlu and Ventura, 2002; Álvarez-Albelo, 
Manresa and Pigem-Vigo, 2009; Ji and Seater, 2014). 
Whether in autarky or in a trade situation, country P grows at the same exogenous 
rate, while for country B trade becomes the only possibility of achieving higher growth 
than in autarky by boosting investment in physical capital.3 Lastly, we consider an 
import tariff established by country B which could never be growth enhancing4 (e.g. 
Grossman and Helpman,1990; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Lee, 2011), though it 
might be welfare-increasing for the backward economy. 
The economies produce a non-traded final good with two traded intermediate inputs, 
goods x  and z .5 The final good technologies in countries may differ in input shares, 
reflecting different input intensities. This assumption is crucial for the purpose of our 
study, since it allows any growth outcome in country B, going from autarky growth to 
convergence in growth rate with the partner. 
The production of intermediate goods uses capital and labour. The countries have the 
same AK technology in sector z , which is the result of an external learning-by-doing 
(LBD) process à la Arrow (1962). The LBD process plays a key role in the backward 
economy because it represents a latent engine of growth for taking advantage of trade 
gains in terms of long-run growth. In sector x  there is exogenous labour-augmenting 
                                                 
3 Empirical results have shown that trade impacts growth mainly via capital investment (e.g. Levine and 
Renelt, 1992; Wacziarg and Welch, 2008). 
4 Some of the empirical literature has found a negative relationship between tariffs and growth (e.g. 
Connolly and Yi, 2009). 
5 Trade in intermediate goods entails a large share of trade flows among countries. As reported in 
Miroudot, Lanz and Ragoussis (2009), for OECD countries trade in intermediate inputs represents 56% 
(in 2006) and 73% (in 2005 or last year available) of trade flows of goods and services, respectively. The 
figures for Brazil, China and India are 72% and 67%, 75% and 87%, 80% and 46%, respectively. 
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technical progress, with productivity gains being greater in country P than in country 
B.6 Thus, there are two sources of growth in the world: exogenous productivity gains in 
sector x  and a LBD process in sector z . In addition, we assume that markets are 
competitive, international factor flows are not allowed and foreign and domestic 
intermediate goods are homogenous. Our analysis is mainly focused on the long-run 
equilibrium, though we also perform some numerical exercises to offer some insight on 
short-term effects. 
The comparative advantages of countries in the long-run rely on exogenous 
productivity gains in sector x  and input intensities in the final good sector. Since 
relative prices reflect the relative scarcity of intermediate goods, identical input shares 
in countries would result in country P (country B) having comparative advantage in 
good x  (good z ). However, comparative advantages may reverse when country P is 
less intensive in good x  than country B. 
For benefiting from trade in terms of faster growth, country B must get rid of sector 
x , with exogenous productivity gains, and being specialised in sector z , with LBD. 
This is equivalent to saying that, by importing good x , the backward economy can 
“use” the more productive technology of the partner. Remarkably, we obtain that such 
comparative advantage is facilitated by a high enough intensity in good x  and faster 
growth in country P. Otherwise, country B would not benefit from foreign productivity 
gains, so its long-run growth rate would remain unchanged. 
Thus, faster growth emerges in country B because of specialisation and a more 
favourable relative price than in autarky, which raises the interest rate and hence capital 
                                                 
6 Empirical evidence has documented differences in sectoral total factor productivity between countries 
(e.g. Fadinger and Fleiss, 2011). 
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accumulation. Yet, the import tariff might be growth impairing, since it introduces a 
wedge between international and domestic relative prices. 
When country B has the growth-enhancing comparative advantage, the trade 
equilibrium in the long-run can be characterised by either complete or incomplete 
specialisation of country P while, by construction, the backward economy will only 
produce good z . The specialisation regime of country P relies on whether or not trade 
leads to the equalisation of interest rates which, in turn, depends on the input shares in 
the final good production. 
Trade gives rise to an equilibrium with incomplete specialisation when country P is 
less intensive in good x  than country B. As a result, country B eventually faces the 
more favourable autarky price of the partner, which raises its growth. Nonetheless, 
country B cannot reach the partner’s growth rate as long as both countries have an AK 
technology in sector z , which prevents the equalisation of interest rates. Moreover, the 
growth rate of country B is affected by both foreign growth and a domestic import 
tariff. On one hand, an acceleration of foreign growth improves country B’s terms of 
trade, yielding a raise in the interest rate and hence in the growth rate. On the other, an 
increase in the tariff rate reduces the internal relative price and interest rate, thus leading 
to slower growth. For getting some insight on the net impact, we perform numerical 
exercises using empirically plausible parameter values, and obtain that domestic growth 
is more affected by a variation of foreign growth than by a change in a domestic tariff. 
Country P is completely specialised in good x  when its economy is sufficiently more 
intensive in this good than country B. This specialisation regime allows the equalisation 
of interest rates and hence converge in growth rate. This is so because there is an AK 
technology in sector z  and a Cobb-Douglas technology —involving decreasing 
returns— in sector x . Owing to the AK technology in sector z , the domestic relative 
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price in country B does not depend on the import tariff, so there is room for placing the 
international relative price above the one arising under free trade. Consequently, a 
higher growth rate in country P increases the growth rate of country B, but changes in 
the import tariff have no impact on domestic growth. Thus, convergence in growth rate 
can be an outcome in the presence of an import tariff and also under free trade, but in 
both cases growth acceleration in country P has a positive impact on country B’s 
growth. Our results are then consistent with the aforementioned empirical evidence. 
Our work is closely related to previous studies on trade as an engine for growth. 
Manresa and Pigem-Vigo (1999) and Álvarez-Albelo et al. (2009) showed that a 
stagnated economy can converge in growth rate with a growing country simply by 
trading in intermediate goods. The mechanism of convergence is similar to ours. 
However, their models entail the same technology to accumulating capital in countries, 
so they are unable to deliver different growth outcomes in the backward economy. With 
a multi-country model involving AK-type economies, Acemoğlu and Ventura (2002) 
obtained that trade and specialisation yield convergence in growth rates even in the 
absence of decreasing returns. The mechanism of convergence lies in the fact that 
countries that accumulate capital faster (slower) than the world average experience a 
worsening (an improvement) of their terms of trade. Ji and Seater (2014) developed a 
model involving R&D and endogenous market structures that can endogenously deliver 
any growth outcome in countries. Their framework accounts for the effects of trade on 
growth —operating via comparative advantage— and also on growth on trade —
operating via changes in the trading regime. The mechanism through which trade 




The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The second section presents the 
model. The third section solves the autarky equilibrium. The role of comparative 
advantage for growing through trade is analysed in the fourth section. The fifth section 
finds the conditions for country B to have the growth-enhancing comparative advantage 
and characterises the trade equilibrium. The sixth section analyses the impact of the 
partner’s growth and an import tariff on growth of country B. The seventh section 
concludes. 
II. THE MODEL 
The model involves two technologically different countries: country B, a backward 
economy that seeks to increase its growth rate simply by trading with a faster growing 
partner, country P. In an autarky situation they grow at an exogenous rate i , ,i B P , 
with 0 B P   . In this context, the countries engage in trade relationships according to 
their long-run comparative advantages, which might only affect the growth potential of 
the backward economy. In addition, country B sets an import tariff that can never be 
growth-enhancing. 
In each period,  t 0,  , both economies are inhabited by a continuum of identical 
households that is normalised to one. The households are endowed with one unit of time 
that can be only allocated to work, so the labour input is equal to the unity. The 
countries produce a non-traded final good with two traded intermediate inputs. The final 
good can be used for consumption and investment in physical capital. The factor inputs 
labour and capital are allocated to the production of intermediate goods. In addition, 
markets are competitive, international factor flows are not allowed and foreign and 
domestic intermediate goods are homogeneous. 
7 
 
The non-traded final good,  iy t , is produced with the Cobb-Douglas technology: 
             i i1i i i iy t x t z t , 0,1 ,     (1) 
where  ix t  and  iz t  denote the total productions of intermediate inputs. However, 
this notation will adequately change in the trade situation. We purposely assume that 
input shares may be different in countries, i.e. B P  . Under this assumption 
convergence in growth rate is not guaranteed, since it may impede the equalisation of 
countries’ interest rates. Henceforth, it is convenient to keep in mind that good x  is 
chosen as the numeraire. Thus, one unit of final good costs  ip t  units of good x , 
while one unit of good z  costs  izp t  units of good x . 
We consider the following technologies for intermediate goods: 
              i 1ti i ix B Px t k t e l t , 0,1 , 0 ,         (2) 
               1i i i izz t k t k t 1 l t , 0,1 ,     (3) 
where  ixk t  and  il t  denote capital and labour allocated to sector x , respectively, and 
 izk t  and  i1 l t  represents the amount of factor inputs used in sector z .7 In sector z  
productivity gains come from an external LBD process linked to capital per capita of the 
economy,      i i ix zk t k t k t  , and hence the technologies become of AK type. The 
LBD process entails a latent engine of productivity gains that may allow country B to 
take advantage of trade gains in terms of growth. The variable ite  represents labour-
augmenting technical progress with exogenous growth rate i . Since 0 B P   , in 
                                                 
7 For notational simplicity, the equilibrium condition of the labour market has been introduced. 
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autarky country P will enjoy a higher long-run growth rate than country B. We consider 
identical factor shares between countries and across sectors. This simplifying 
assumption allows us to identify   and 1   with aggregate capital and labour shares 
which, according to some of the empirical literature, do not differ much between 
countries (e.g. Gollin, 2002). Moreover, it allows us to obtain closed-form solutions. 
Furthermore, in a trade situation country B sets an import tariff with tax rate 0  , 
and distribute the tax revenues among the households in the form of lump sum transfers, 
 BT t 0 . In the presence of an import tariff the price of the good produced 
domestically might differ from the one imported. However, in our model market forces 
lead to price equalisation provided that domestic and foreign goods are homogenous. 
Preferences are identical in both countries. The representative household derives 
utility from consumption,  ic t , and maximises its intertemporal utility discounted at 
the rate  : 










    (4) 
subject to the budget constraint: 
              i i i i i i ia t r t a t w t T t p t c t ,     (5) 
and the initial condition,  ia 0 0 .8 The variable  ir t  denotes interest rate and  iw t  
is the wage. Moreover, in a trade situation it holds that  BT t 0  and  PT t 0 . 
                                                 
8 In equilibrium the household’s wealth  ia t  will be equal to    i ip t k t . 
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III. AUTARKY EQUILIBRIUM 
The maximisation of profits in the final good sectors implies that the prices of 
intermediate goods are equal to their respective values of marginal productivities. Thus, 
 izp t  can be expressed in terms of the relative production of intermediate goods: 
 
    
       










x t x t1p t .
z ty t




      
 (6) 
The maximisation of profits in the intermediate good sectors allows interest rate and the 
wage to be written as: 











i i i i i
zi
i i i i i i
x z
x t p t p t z t p t1r t ,
p t k t p t p t k t p t
           (7) 






x t z t
w t 1 1 p t ,
l t 1 l t
       (8) 
where 0   is the depreciation rate of capital. Moreover, the equation driving 
consumption through time comes from solving the household’s problem: 






c t p t1 r t .
c t p t

      
   (9) 
The competitive equilibrium is a set of allocations and prices that satisfy firms and 
household problems, and clear all markets in the economy. The relative prices in (6) and 
factor price equalisation in (7) yield the factor allocation: 







   (10) 
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Using equations (2), (3), (6) and (10),  izp t  can be expressed as: 







      
 (11) 
Also, using equations (1), (2), (3), (6), (7) and (10) we can write the interest rate as: 
 
             




1 it1 zi i




i z i i
z
p ter t A p t 1
k t p t
p t












where   ii 1i i iA 1     . After introducing (12) in the growth rate of consumption in 
(9), we obtain: 
 
 
        








c t 1 eA p t
c t k t










The long-run equilibrium is a balanced growth path (BGP) where the growth rate is 










     
 (14) 
IV. THE ROLE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE FOR GROWING THROUGH 
TRADE 
From the autarky prices in equation (14) it follows that country B might have 
comparative advantage in good z  or in good x . By solving the trade equilibrium in 
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country B at exogenously given terms of trade, we show that growing through trade 
with country P is only possible when the former economy has comparative advantage in 
good z . 
Comparative Advantage in Good z 
Trade may allow country B to get rid of lower productivity gains in sector x  by 
importing good x , and so “using” the more efficient technology of country P. The final 
good production can be then written as        B B1B P BB By t x t z t  , where  Bx t  is 
the domestic production of good x ,  PBx t  is the imported production of good x  
(produced in country P and used in country B). The amount of good z  produced and 
used within country B is denoted as  BBz t , and hence the exported production is 
denoted as  BPz t . We will maintain these notation criteria throughout the paper. The 
equilibrium in the trade balance implies that      P BB z Px t p t z t , where the omission of 
the country superscript denotes international price. Moreover, the interest rate can be 
expressed as: 
         , ,B zB B DB z B z
p t
r t A p 1
p t
         (15) 
where  ,B Dz zp p 1    is the domestic relative price. After introducing the interest 
rate in the equation (9), we obtain the growth rate of country B in the long-run, B : 
       iff    BB,DB zB B,D BB z zA p p p .
   
     (16) 
The equation (16) reveals that a growth increase will emerge from trade provided that 




z zp p . More remarkably, faster growth in the partner’s economy improves the 
terms of trade of country B which leads to a higher interest rate and growth rate. 
However, an increase in the import tariff may impair growth unless this economy can 
influence the international relative price. This issue will be analysed later on. 
Comparative Advantage in Good x 
The final good production can be written as        B B1B B B PB By t x t z z t   , while 
the equilibrium in the trade balance is      B PP z Bx t p t z t . Since the terms of trade 
become constant in the long-run, country B enjoys its own productivity gains in sector 
x  and hence growth at the same rate as in autarky: 




B B z B
1 eA p ,
k t
   

           
 (17) 
where  B,Dz zp p 1    is the domestic relative price. 
V. GROWTH-ENHANCING COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE TRADE 
EQUILIBRIUM 
In this section we address four questions. We first identify the conditions for country B 
to have the growth-enhancing comparative advantage. We then characterise the trade 
equilibrium arising under this specialisation pattern. The trade equilibrium allows us to 
undertake the third task, namely to study the potential impacts of trade on the long-run 




The Comparative Advantages of Countries 
Figure 1 illustrates the determinants of countries’ comparative advantages. The autarky 
price of country P as a function of P ,  Pz P Pp , ,   , is indicated with a solid line. The 
dashed/dotted line represents country B’s autarky price as a function of B , 
 Bz B Bp , ,   . The functions reach a maximum at  maxi i1        , which is 
smaller than one for empirically plausible parameter values. We set B B   , so have 
chosen a particular value for country B’s autarky price,  Bz Bp  . Thus, we can define a 
threshold value  P B P B, ,       such that     B Pz B z P B P Pp p , , , ,        .9 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Consequently, the condition  P P B P, ,      implies that country B has 
comparative advantage in good x , while  P P B P, ,      leads to the opposite result. 
Remarkably, faster growth in country P ( P P 
 ) moves its autarky price upwards, 
 Pz P Pp , ,    (indicated with a dashed line), thus amplifying the range of values for P  
that allows country B to have comparative advantage in good z . 
The Trade Equilibrium 
As commented earlier, country B will eventually be completely specialised in good z , 
since country P has absolute advantage in good x . Country P, however, might produce 
                                                 
9 The autarky prices might also coincide for a higher P . We leave aside this possibility since it involves 
extreme values for P . For example, the parameter values in Table 1 from Cooley and Prescott (1995) (at 
the end of the section) and B 0   yield maxB 0.74   and  B maxz Bp 0.35  , and autarky prices become 
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both goods (incomplete specialisation), or just good x  (complete specialisation), which 
relies on the input shares of countries in the final good production. 
The production of final good in country B has been indicated in the previous section, 
while country P’s can be written as          P P1P P P BP Py t x t z t z t   . The 
maximisation of profits in the final good sector of countries and the equilibrium in the 
trade balance yield the equilibrium expression for the international relative price: 







z t z t

 
   (18) 
where    B B B B1 1        . The interest rate of country B appeared in (15), 
while country P’s come from the equation (12) after removing the country superscript in 
the relative price of good z . The interest rate and wage equalisation between sectors in 
country P yields the factor allocation: 






k t k t
l t .
k t k t
     (19) 
Lastly, the exported proportions by countries come from (18) and (19): 







   (20) 






x t 1 l t
1 .
x t l t
      (21) 
                                                                                                                                               
equal for .P 0 49   and .P 0 94  . A value .B 0 0056   yield maxB 0.73   and  B maxz Bp 0.38  , and 
prices are equal for .P 0 53   and .P 0 90  . 
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The Long-run Growth Rate of Country B 
We set an import tariff that allows a growth increase in country B which, according to 
(16), requires that: 
          P P BB max maxz z zz B
z
p p pp 0, ,
1 p
  
      (22) 
The growth possibilities of country B depend on whether or not trade leads to interest 
rate equalisation between countries. The interest rates, in turn, hinge on international 
relative prices. Thus, to study the growth potential outcomes of country B we rely on 
the trade equilibrium just computed and also on the relative prices depicted in Figure 2. 
In the figure, autarky prices  Bz Bp   and  Pz Pp   are denoted with dotted lines, while 
international and domestic relative prices of good z , zp  and  zp 1  , are indicated 
with solid lines. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Let us first consider a trade equilibrium with incomplete specialisation of the partner, 
where country B faces country P’s autarky price, i.e. Pz zp p . As both economies 
produce good z  with an AK technology, the growth rates of countries P and B 
converge to: 
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respectively. For better understanding the results in equation (24), it is convenient to 
notice that in a free trade (FT) equilibrium with no tariff the interest rates (growth rates) 










     

   (25) 
However, since the tariff reduces the domestic price of country B this equalisation 
would require a higher P  ( P Bˆ   ), which depends on the tariff size, and hence an 
international price   FTz1 p  and a domestic price FTzp . 
Let us assume that P P Pˆ    , so the autarky price of country P and the domestic 
price of country B are such that    B P P FTz z z zp p 1 p 1 p      . From equation (24) 
it follows that country B grows faster than in autarky, i.e. B B  , because its domestic 
price is higher than its autarky price. Nonetheless, it would need a domestic price as 
FT
zp  to converge in growth rate with the partner; so the backward economy grows more 
slowly than country P, i.e. B P  . Accordingly, factor allocation in country P in 
equation (19) converge to that in autarky, and the exported proportions by countries B 
and P in (20) and (21) approach to B  and zero, respectively. 
Under incomplete specialisation of country P, convergence in growth rate (interest 
rate) is only possible when P Pˆ  . In this case, the factor allocation in country P 
would be equal to P B 1   , and the exported proportions by countries B and P 
would be B  and  P P B    , respectively. 
The condition P Pˆ   may also lead to incomplete specialisation of country P 
provided that P B 1   . So does the condition P Pˆ  . Since there is a Cobb-
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Douglas technology in sector x  involving decreasing returns, capital of country P is 
adjusted to enable the equalisation of interest rates and hence of growth rates: 
          P P 11 tFT PP zP PA 1 p k t e ,
     
        (26) 
   BFTB zB PA p
   
  

  (27) 
The exported proportions by countries B and P become equal to B  and P1  , 
respectively. 
Welfare Impacts as a Rationale for an Import Tariff 
A question that must be addressed refers to the rationale of setting a tariff in this 
context. The results just exposed rely on country B’s capability to affect the 
international relative price. Under incomplete specialisation, country B faces the autarky 
price of the partner, so an import tariff will harm its growth and welfare. 
However, under complete specialisation the international price comes from the 
interplay between countries. This consideration has a significant implication, namely an 
import tariff might enhance welfare of country B. Therefore, there could be a rationale 
for such a policy. This possibility can be analysed by computing long-run capital and 
the allocation of final output between consumption and gross investment. The Appendix 
contains the details on the computation. Detrended capital stocks of countries in the 
long-run,   Pti ik k t e , can be written as: 
     P P1 PP P FT1 1z z kk p 1 p     0,   
         (28) 
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         (29) 
From now on detrended variables will be denoted with a bar. The tariff acts reducing the 
interest rate of country P in (26), thus leading to lower capital accumulation in both 
economies. However, the smaller exported proportion B  attenuates the fall of capital 
in country B. 
The allocation of final output allows analysing the tariff impact on consumption and 
hence on welfare: 
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   

      
  
   
  (31) 
where igi  denotes gross investment. Equation (28) and (30) reveal that the tariff reduces 
country P’s final output and gross investment by the same proportion, so this economy 
experiences a fall in consumption and welfare. Final output is reduced because of lower 
capital stocks and imported proportion of good z , i.e. B . An inspection of equations 
(29) and (31) shows quite different results for country B. Indeed, final output decreases 
by a lower proportion than gross investment since the fall in capital stocks is attenuated 
by the higher proportion of good z  that is used within the country, B1  . 
Consequently, the tariff has an ambiguous effect on consumption. An increase in 
consumption and hence in welfare might take place when the tariff has a little impact on 
capital accumulation, which may occur when country P is highly intensive in good x , 
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i.e. for high enough P . This is so because the international price barely affects the 
interest rate of country P. Next, we explore this possibility through numerical examples. 
We compute the long-run values of detrended capital, consumption, final output and 
international and domestic prices of good z  under free trade and with an import tariff. 
To do so, we consider the calibration by Cooley and Prescott (1995) (CP,1995) for the 
USA, which provides us with reliable parameter values reflecting actual behaviour of an 
economy. In addition, we set B 0  , B 0.5  ,  P 0.6 ,0.85   and 0.1  . Table 1 
contains the results. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Consistently with our theoretical analysis, the fall in countries’ capital stock and final 
output caused by the tariff is lower under P 0.85   than with P 0.6  . Moreover, the 
former value yields a decrease in country B’s consumption while an increase is obtained 
in the latter one. 
VI. THE GROWTH IMPACTS OF FOREIGN GROWTH AND A DOMESTIC 
IMPORT TARIFF 
This section analyses the relative impacts of changes in foreign growth and a tariff 
on the long-run growth rate of country B. In addition, we also compute numerically the 
transition under complete specialisation to get some insight of temporary growth 
impacts of a tariff. 
Foreign Growth and Tariff Effects on Long-Run Growth 
The previous analysis has shown that country B benefited from trade in terms of growth 
simply because of specialisation and a more favourable relative price than in autarky. 
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Notwithstanding, an import tariff set domestically can either impair growth (incomplete 
specialisation) or leave country B’s growth rate unchanged (complete specialisation). 
Thus, the growth possibilities of country B rely on the determinants of the domestic 
relative price. 
Under incomplete specialisation, the growth rate of country B in equation (24) is 
positively related to the international price Pzp  —in equation (14)— which in turn is an 
increasing function of the partner’s growth rate. However, the import tariff is growth-
reducing since country B cannot influence the international price. For assessing the 
relative growth impacts of changes in these two variables, we compute the percentage 
variation of country B’s domestic relative price in response to a percentage point change 
in the partner’s growth rate (growth elasticity, , ,B Dz Pp  ) and in the import tariff (tariff 
elasticity, , ,B Dzp  ): 
 ,
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P z P P
p 1 0
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      










   
       (33) 
The elasticity in (32) shows that a growth acceleration in the partner’s economy has a 
positive impact on the growth rate of country B, since it entails an increase in the 
international price and hence in the interest rate. The growth elasticity becomes greater 
the higher P  and the lower P . Contrariwise, a rise in the import tariff reduces the 
domestic price, the interest rate and hence the growth rate of the backward economy. 
The tariff elasticity (in absolute) value is greater the higher the tariff rate. Therefore, a 
reduction (an increase) in the domestic import tariff might be compensated by an 
increase (a reduction) in foreign growth, thus keeping the growth rate of country B 
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unchanged. This result reveals that domestic conditions are not the only ones that matter 
for assessing the impact of trade on growth, but also the foreign ones, as shown by 
empirical evidence. The relative growth impacts can be summarised as follows: 




P P P P
.             
           (34) 
It is worthwhile to notice that the relationship in (34) can be clarified by comparing 
the maximum tariff max  in equation (22) with * . Indeed, the tariff rate must be lower 
than max  for country B to benefit from trade in terms of growth, so the condition 
max *   would directly lead to , ,, ,B D B Dz P zp p   , while max *   would be consistent 
with any relationship between these elasticities. By way of illustration, we compute 
numerically max  and *  under several i  covering its value range. The parameters and 
results are displayed in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In the table, we have set B 0   and B P   to amplify the distance between Pzp  
and Bzp  thus allowing a sizeable max . In other words, we establish favourable 
conditions for max  to exceed * . Even though, for all i  we obtain that max *  , so in 
our examples foreign growth turns out to have a greater impact on domestic growth than 
the import tariff. Moreover, it should be highlighted that, according World Bank data,10 
tariff rates in Table 2 are well above actual figures of most countries, so a greater 
growth impact could be expected from faster foreign growth than from a tariff increase. 
                                                 
10 The World Bank data refer to “the average of effectively applied rates weighted by the product import 
shares corresponding to each partner country.” 
22 
 
By contrast, when the partner is completely specialised in good x  the growth rate of 
country B in equation (27) does not depend on the import tariff. However, domestic and 
foreign growth rates exhibit a positive one-to-one relationship because countries 
converge in growth rate. It is also worth noticing that convergence in growth rate may 
take place in the presence of an import tariff and under free trade. Indeed, in the former 
case the domestic price is lower than the international price,  FT FTz zp 1 p  , while in 
the latter one both countries face the international price FTzp .11 
Short-run Growth Effects of a Tariff 
Under incomplete specialisation of the partner country B becomes negligible in terms of 
income inasmuch as it grows at a lower rate. Thus, in a neighbourhood of the long-run 
equilibrium country B becomes an AK-type of economy facing a constant international 
price. 
By contrast, the long-run equilibrium under complete specialisation is a BGP where 
both economies grow at the same rate P . Therefore, the trade interaction between the 
countries may give rise to sizeable short-run growth effects in both economies that 
deserve to be analysed. In this respect, it should be noticed that though a tariff does not 
affect the long-run growth rate it does have temporary growth impacts. For analysing 
these impacts, we compute numerically the transitional dynamics in a neighbourhood of 
the BGP under free trade and with a tariff rate of 10%. The set of differential equations 
that compose the dynamic system can be found in the Appendix. 
                                                 
11 Of course, this could be the case for retaliation by country P in order to pay the lowest relative price of 
good z , FTzp . However, and unlike in Devereux (1993), growth in country B would remain unchanged 
since this economy cannot affect the growth rate of the partner. 
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Figures 3 and 4 depict time paths of the growth rates of capital and final output and 
also of international and domestic prices of good z  for P 0.6   and P 0.85  , 
respectively. Initial detrended capital stocks are set lower than their long-run values so 
capital and final output will increase along the transition. 
FIGURES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
The figures show that the introduction of a tariff yields temporary growth declines of 
capital and hence of final output in both economies. This behaviour can be better 
understood by looking at the dynamic system in the Appendix. Given capital stocks, the 
tariff causes a permanent increase in the international price and a temporary decrease in 
the domestic price, which reduces the interest rate and hence the incentives to 
accumulate capital in both economies. Moreover, Figure 4 shows a smaller decline in 
the growth rates of capital and final output of the partner than Figure 3, which is 
consistent with our analysis on the welfare impacts of a tariff under complete 
specialisation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Some of the empirical literature have showed that the trading partners’ growth matters 
more for explaining the impact of trade on domestic growth than trade openness. Based 
on this empirical evidence, we have explored how the possibility of growing through 
trade is affected by foreign growth and a domestic import tariff. To this aim, we have 
developed a two-country model based on Ventura’s (1997), where a backward economy 
seeks to increase its long-run growth rate simple by trading with a faster growing 
partner. Our model involves neither international spillovers nor technology transfers, 
and trade impacts growth solely via the comparative advantage. Owing to countries’ 
24 
 
differences in the technology to accumulate capital, the model can deliver any growth 
outcome in the backward economy, ranging from autarky growth to convergence in 
growth rate with the partner. In addition, the backward economy sets an import tariff 
that could never be growth enhancing, though it might be welfare-increasing. 
We have obtained that growing through trade requires having comparative advantage 
in a sector with constant returns to capital, which is facilitated by a higher growth rate 
of the partner. Thus, the backward economy benefits from trade in terms of sustained 
growth because of specialisation and a more favourable relative price than in autarky. 
Consistent with the empirical evidence, growth acceleration in the partner’s economy 
always improves the terms of trade of the backward economy, thus leading to higher 
domestic growth. By contrast, domestic growth can be either negatively affected or 
unaffected by a tariff raise, which depends on the specialisation regime (incomplete or 
complete) of the partner. Moreover, under complete specialisation of the partner, 
convergence in growth rate takes place both under free trade and with an import tariff. 
Despite its simplicity, our model can deliver results that agree with the 
abovementioned empirical findings. We then conclude that, as the empirical evidence 
suggests, considering foreign conditions could be more fruitful when analysing the 
connection between trade and growth than just focusing on domestic ones, such as the 
degree of openness. 
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Fig.1. The comparative advantages according to intermediate input shares and the 




 Fig. 2. International and domestic relative prices and the growth potential outcomes of 
country B 
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 Fig. 3. Short-run growth effects of a tariff under incomplete specialisation: P 0.6   
Note: Transitional paths are computed with the parameter values in Table 1. Initial de-trended capital 




 Fig. 4. Short-run growth effects of a tariff under incomplete specialisation: P 0.85   
Note: Transitional paths are computed with the parameter values in Table 1. Initial de-trended capital 
stocks are P0k 2.5  and B0k 0.75 . The solid lines refers to the case 0   and the dashed lines refer to 





Welfare impact of a tariff under complete specialisation: Numerical examples 
Parameter values 
Preferences: 1  , 0.056   (CP, 1995) 
Technology: 0.4  , 0.048  , P 0.0156   (CP, 1995), B 0  , B 0.5   
Long-run equilibrium 
P    Pk  Bk  Pc  Bc  Py  By  zp  B,Dzp  
0.60 
0.0 4.836 4.202 1.138 0.989 1.446 1.256 0.358 0.358 
0.1 4.538 3.911 1.068 0.976 1.357 1.225 0.393 0.358 
FT  0.938 0.931 0.938 0.987 0.938 0.975 1.100 1.000 
0.85 
0.0 4.782 1.569 1.126 0.369 1.430 0.469 0.358 0.358 
0.1 4.669 1.483 1.099 0.370 1.396 0.465 0.393 0.358 
FT  0.976 0.945 0.976 1.003 0.976 0.991 1.100 1.000 
Note: FT  refers to value in a trade equilibrium with tariff over value under free trade. 
TABLE 2 
Growth impacts of foreign growth and a tariff under incomplete specialisation: 
Numerical examples 
Parameter values 
Preferences: 1  , 0.056   (CP, 1995) 
Technology: 0.4  , 0.048  , P 0.0156   (CP, 1995), B 0   
P B   0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  
Results 
B
zp  0.015  0.086  0.185  0.270  0.325  0.349  0.347  0.321  
P
zp  0.029  0.137  0.263  0.358  0.410  0.427  0.413  0.375  
max  1.011  0.593  0.418  0.323  0.262  0.221  0.191  0.168  
*  1.875  0.769  0.484  0.353  0.278  0.229  0.195  0.169  




Appendix. Trade equilibrium under complete specialisation of countries 
Country P 
Firms in the final good sector solve the problem: 
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The first order conditions (FOCs) are: 
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  (35) 
Firms in sector x  maximise the present value of net cash flows: 
             t P0 Pr d 1tP P P P
0
e k t e w t p t gi t dt
   
      
subject to the change of capital stock      P P Pk t gi t k t  , where  Pgi t  denotes 
gross investment. The FOCs are: 
      P Pw t 1 x t    (36) 
    P Pxp t t   (37) 





t t r t
k t
        (38) 
where  Px t  is capital shadow price, which is equal to the price of final good. The 
interest rate comes from equations (37) and (38): 








x t p t1r t
p t k t p t
       (39) 











subject to the budget constraint: 
            P P P P P Pa t r t a t w t p t c t     (40) 
The FOCs of the problem are: 
       P P Phc t t p t     (41) 
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       P P Ph ht t r t      (42) 
where  Ph t  is the shadow price of wealth. The equation driving consumption is 
obtained from (41) and (42): 






c t p t1 r t
c t p t

      
 
  (43) 
Country B 
Firms in the final good sector solve the problem: 
               B B1B P B P BB B B z Bp t x t z t 1 x t p t z t       
The first order conditions (FOCs) are: 
 
    
       











x t p t x t1p t
1 z ty t




        
  (44) 
where  B,Dzp t  is the domestic relative price. 
Firms in sector z  maximise the present value of net cash flows: 
                t B0 r d 1B B B B Bz
0
ˆe p t k t k t w t p t gi t dt
        
subject to the change of capital stock      B B Bk t gi t k t  , where  Bgi t  denotes 
gross investment and  Bkˆ t  is an externality. The FOCs are: 
       B Bzw t p t 1 z t    (45) 
    B Bzp t t   (46) 
            
B
B B B
z z z B
z t
t t r t p t
k t
        (47) 
where  Bz t  is capital shadow price, which is equal to the price of final good. The 
interest rate comes from equations (46) and (47): 








p t z t p t
r t
p t k t p t
       (48) 
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subject to the budget constraint: 
              B B B B B B Ba t r t a t w t T t p t c t      (49) 
where the lump-sum transfer is    B PBT t x t . 
The FOCs of the problem are: 
       B B Bhc t t p t     (50) 
       B B Bh ht t r t      (51) 
where  Bh t  is the shadow price of wealth. The equation driving consumption is 
obtained from (50) and (51): 






c t p t1 r t
c t p t

      
 
  (52) 
Equilibrium 
The equilibrium in the trade balance is: 
             
P
BP B
B z P z B
P
x t
x t p t z t p t
z t
     (53) 
The exported proportions of goods come from (35), (44) and (53): 
   
 




x t z t
1 ,
x t z t
      (54) 
where    B B B B1 1        . Equations (53) and (54) allow writing the 
relative price of good z  as: 
          
  
 





k t e k t
p t p t
k t k t
  
 
      (55) 
where     Pti ik t k t e  denote detrended capital. From now on detrended variables 
will be denoted with a bar. 
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From equations (35), (39), (44) and (48), the interest rate of countries can be 
expressed as: 
 
     
 
 










p t1 1r t A ,
p t k t p t







               
     


  (56) 
From equations (9), (18), (21) and (22), we obtain the law of motion of detrended 
consumption: 









k tc t 1 A
c t 1 k t


    


          

  (57) 









k tc t 11 A
c t 1 k t


     
           

  (58) 
Combining equations (1), (2), (3), (5), (10), (11), (12), (14), (15), (19) and (20), 
detrended capital accumulation in country i  can be written as 
         i i i iPk t y t c t k t     . Substituting per capita income we obtain: 
                P PPP 11P P B P PP B Pk t k t k t c t k t          (59) 
 
           






k t 1 1 k t k t
c t k t





  (60) 
The dynamic system is composed of equations (57) through (60). 
We can compute per capita income of countries, expressed in units of good x , using 
(35), (44), (54) and (55):  
           P 1tP P P Pp t y t x t k t e ,      (61) 
               P 1tB B B PB Pz
B B
1 1p t y t p t z t 1 k t e
1
    
      (62) 
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The shares of countries of world per capita income are: 
          
   
   
  
  
P P B B
PB
i i i i
B P B P
i i
p t y t p t y t 1 1
,   
p t y t 1 1 p t y t 1 1
 
     
           (63) 
Therefore, the tariff allows country B to obtain a greater portion of world per capita 
income at the expense of country P’s share. 















P P PP P B
B P B
B B PB P B
y t k t k t
1 ,
y t k t k t
y t k t k t
1
y t k t k t
  
  
   
   
 
 
  (64) 
Long-run equilibrium 
In the long-run equilibrium    i ic t k t 0  , and detrended variables become constant. 































    
                          


  (65) 
and detrended capital stocks of countries are: 
     P P1 PP P FT1 1z z kk p 1 p     0   
         (66) 
 









k1 1 kk p 1 p     0
p
  
     
        
  (67) 
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An increase in the import tariff reduces capital stocks of both countries. Indeed: 
 
 
     










B P BP FTP 1 1
z z 1 1B 1
1 11k p p
1










     








         
  (68) 
Detrended consumption of countries is obtained from (59), (60), (66) and (67): 
           P P P P
P P
1 1
P P FT P FT1 1 1 1
P z z P z z
y gi
c A p 1 p p 1 p
   
      
               (69) 
 
           















1c A 1 p p
1 p 1 p












  (70) 
An import tariff reduces final output, gross investment and consumption of country P 
by the same proportion. However, it reduces final output of country B by a lower 
proportion than gross investment. As a result, the variation of country B’s consumption 
is ambiguous. 
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